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In  this  work  we  intend  to  study  how  the  quality  of  the  institutional  factor  may 
influence  the  efficiency  of  redistribution  policy  specifically  associated  with  human 
capital accumulation. We develop a conceptual discussion building on the importance of 
income redistribution for economic growth and the key role of political institutions in 
securing  growth-enhancing  redistribution  policies.  We  introduce  endogenous  growth 
theory elements into our analysis by considering as a fundamental source of economic 
growth  human  capital  accumulation,  motivated  by  tax-financed  education  secured 
through efficient redistribution policies. We outline crucial insights on the underlying 
mechanisms,  emphasizing  however  that  extensive  research  on  the  subject  is 
undoubtedly  still  required.  In  particular,  we  identify  the  main  factors  negatively 
affecting the decisive role of political institutions and, consequently, distorting efficient 
redistribution policy. We then define a political-economic equilibrium as a combination 
of  intermediately  strong  state  and  efficient  control-rights  institutions,  implying 
simultaneous  protection  from  expropriation  and  implementation  of  efficient 
redistribution policy, conducive to sustained economic growth.  
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The  endogenous  relationship  between  political  institutions,  policy  and  economic 
growth is one of the greatest challenges in the new political economy of growth. In this 
work, based on a comparative critical assessment of an extensive literature covering 
both  political  economy  and  economic  growth  fields,  we  attempt  to  study  how  the 
quality of the institutional factor may influence the efficiency of redistribution policy 
specifically associated with human capital accumulation.  
Our conceptual discussion builds on the importance of income redistribution for 
economic growth and the key role that political institutions have in securing growth-
enhancing redistribution policies. With income redistribution being often conceived as 
one of the key political channels influencing economic performance, the link between 
income  redistribution  and  economic  growth  is  fundamental  for  the  ongoing  debate. 
While  the  specific  relationship  between  redistribution  and  economic  growth  is 
endogenously  determined  by  implemented  redistribution  mechanisms,  relevant 
literature on this particular topic has emphasized a dual effect, reflecting the possibility 
of an encouraging or an off-putting redistribution effect on growth, and thus making a 
clear distinction between efficient and inefficient redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 
1992; Alesina and Rodrik, 1992; Perotti, 1992, 1996; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; Saint 
Paul and Verdier, 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).  
In line with our research objective and in order to sustain our main argumentation, 
we introduce the element of endogenous growth theory into our analysis by considering 
human capital accumulation as a fundamental source of economic growth (e.g., Lucas, 
1988). Given the similarity in the proposed effects of both human capital accumulation 
and efficient redistribution,
3 we focus our research on growth-enhancing, i.e. efficient 
redistribution  policy  specifically  aimed  at  stimulating  investments  in  human  capital 
accumulation. We analyse it in terms of the explicit positive externalities that it creates 
for economic performance, namely, stimulating human capital accumulation through 
tax-financed education.  
Finally, given that in our research context human capital accumulation is provided 
as a public good, related redistributive implications introduce issues of public provision 
of  a  private  good  into  our  analytical  frame,  raising  awareness  for  the  conflict  of 
                                                           
3  In  particular,  decrease  inequality,  correct  possible  institutional  or  economic  failures  and  stimulate 
investments, improve economic performance and increase growth (e.g. 1996; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; 
Saint Paul and Verdier, 1996; Drazen, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, Acemoglu, 2009).  
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interests, and demanding taking into account the role of public authorities, i.e., political 
institutions.
4 Based on this perspective, we assess how the institutional factor may then 
distort or render inefficient a mechanism otherwise regarded (in the endogenous growth 
literature) as growth-enhancing (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Alesina and Perotti, 1994; 
Drazen, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; and Acemoglu, 2009).  
We  conclude  that  the  quality  of  political  institutions  crucially  determines  the 
efficiency  of  redistribution  policies,  commanding  the  relationship  between  political 
institutions, redistribution and economic outcomes. Focusing on the impact of political 
rivalry, we identify it as the main factor that may negatively affect the expected decisive 
role  of  political  institutions  and,  consequently,  distort  the  effects  of  efficient 
redistribution policy. Moreover, the conducted analysis suggests that political rivalry 
not  only  disfavours  the  expected  impact  of  political  performance  on  economic 
outcomes, but also weakens political institutions per se. This reasoning naturally raises 
the issue of weak versus strong states, in the sense that inept or unprotected as well as 
exceedingly  controlling  institutions  might  be  just  as  costly  to  efficient  economic 
performance and long-run growth (e.g. Acemoglu, 2005).  
The remainder of this work is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the link 
between redistribution and growth, and Section 3 considers, as main building blocks, 
the  relationship  between  political  institutions  and  redistribution,  focusing  on  social 
conflict and incentives, and the role of political institutions in defining redistribution 
policies. Section 4 elaborates on the relation of efficient redistribution to public goods 
in our research context. A conceptual discussion on the interaction between efficient 
redistribution,  political  rivalry  and  the  quality  of  political  institutions  through  the 
perspective of human capital accumulation and control-rights institutions is provided in 
Section 5. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  Redistribution and Economic Growth 
In this section, we discuss some of the latest studies on redistribution policies and 
their impact on economic growth that are relevant for our research objective.  
                                                           
4 By treating investment into human capital accumulation as a publicly-provided private good, we do not 
explicitly  analyse  theoretical  aspects  of  public-goods  theory.  We  simply  assume  that  human  capital 
accumulation  results  from  a  publicly-provided  private  good,  since  it  is  financed  by  tax-revenues 
generated investments secured by efficient redistribution policy.  
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Income  redistribution  is  often  perceived  as  one  of  the  key  political  channels 
influencing economic performance, regarding which related literature has enhanced a 
dual effect, as income redistribution may both hinder and stimulate economic growth. 
More specifically and as will be discussed below, related research distinguishes between 
efficient and inefficient redistribution, suggesting that the crucial factor determining the 
particular  effect  on  growth  is  the  aim  served  by  a  specific  redistribution  policy. 
Therefore, in our analysis we consider efficient and inefficient income redistribution in 
terms of, respectively, explicit positive or negative externalities that it creates. The latter 
arise from excessive taxation and from political considerations outweighing economic 
characteristics;  the  former  generally  imply  promoting  factor  accumulation  through 
stimulating investments, thus in particular making efficient redistribution specifically 
associated with human capital accumulation, our focus of analysis.  
Although  the  objective  of  our  research  is  not  directly  related  to  inefficient 
redistribution,  we  believe  that  a  brief  presentation  of  its  distinctive  features  and 
mechanisms  assumes  some  importance  in  the  view  of  our  subsequent  conceptual 
discussion and analysis of the relationship between redistribution, political institutions 
and  growth.  Also,  given  that  most  studies  on  the  impact  of  redistribution  policies 
generally tend to analyse consequences on either productivity or investment, we adopt a 
similar approach in our presentation of efficient and inefficient redistribution. That is, 
we consider each type of redistribution depending on its negative or positive impact on 
either productivity or investment, and consequently on growth. Inefficient redistribution 
creates distortions by reducing incentives for work or effort, or by compromising and 
discouraging investment. Symmetrically, efficient redistribution policies may actually 
have a positive effect on economic growth by stimulating investments and increasing 
aggregate productivity. 
 
2.1 Inefficient redistribution: productivity and investment channels 
Productivity is one of the major economic performance and growth determinants 
that  may  be  negatively  affected  by  inefficient  redistribution  mechanisms.  Most 
commonly emphasized by specialised research, these may imply political characteristics 
outweighing  economic  considerations,  or  a  politically  motivated  misallocation  of 
resources.  Either  one  will  negatively  affect  aggregate  productivity  and  consequently 
growth. For example, favouring political versus economic considerations implies that 
politicians are unable to commit to ignoring the political characteristics and making  
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long-term promises to reward economically efficient choices.
5 As expected in this case, 
future  redistribution  policy  will  favour  groups  of  suitable  political  characteristics 
disregarding the efficiency  of economic choices made by  these  groups. Similarly,  a 
politically  motivated  misallocation  of  resources  will  exert  a  distortionary  effect  on 
occupational  choices  by  encouraging  individuals  to  enter  a  sector  where  their 
productivity is likely to be low, thus decreasing aggregate output and consequently, 
economic  growth.  Such  artificial  keeping  of  workers  in  an  economically 
disadvantageous industry, and inability to credibly commit to rewarding the move to a 
more productive occupation can result in serious economic inefficiencies. Anticipation 
of such a redistributive policy motivated merely by political considerations will reduce 
or even eliminate economic incentives, which may prevent economically advantageous 
actions  from  being  taken  (Alesina  and  Perotti,  1994;  Dixit  and  Londregan,  1995; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). As it will be discussed in Section 3, from the political 
economy  perspective  the  referred  situations  result  from  an  inefficient  redistributive 
policy in most cases motivated simply by the attempt to gain votes. 
Also  subject  to  negative  inefficient  redistribution  effects  and  at  the  same  time 
crucial  for  determining  efficient  economic  performance  and  growth  are  investment 
decisions.  In  particular,  redistribution  is  inefficient  when  it  discourages  factor 
accumulation by excessive taxation, thus generating low returns on investments and 
depressing  economic  growth.  Analysing  how  redistribution  affects  growth  when 
investments are discouraged by excessive taxation, most seminal studies generally focus 
on size and functional redistribution, and on single versus relative factor endowment 
(Persson and Tabellini, 1992; Alesina and Rodrik, 1992; Acemoglu, 2009). Their results 
suggest  that  distinguishing  between  size  and  functional  income  distribution 
(additionally distinguishing between a single and a relative – labour and capital – factor 
endowment)  is  crucial  for  the  choice  of  an  optimal  redistributive  policy  and  for 
determining the tax rate that maximizes the growth rate of the economy. In either case, 
their  findings  generally  indicate  that  a  higher  (capital)  tax  rate  leads  to  a  lower 
investment rate and, consequently, to a lower growth rate.  
Although the analysis of formal modelling lies outside the scope of this work, it is 
worth  noting  that  the  Median  Voter  Theorem  (MVT)  is  used  as  a  common  tool  of 
                                                           
5 Following Dixit and Londregan (1995), politically successful and economically efficient characteristics 
generally are distributed quite differently and do not match.   
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analysis for studying redistributive implications.
6 Particularly relevant for our research 
objective is this theorem’s implication of the equilibrium policy involving inefficient 
redistribution when political rather than economic characteristics are rewarded, or when 
size or functional taxes are employed.
7 Since, as a rule, the median voter’s income is 
below  the  mean,  a  higher-tax  redistribution  policy  choice  will  be  induced  and 
investments will be discouraged due to a reduction in the after-tax return on capital (e.g. 
Drazen, 2000; Acemoglu, 2009).
8  
Thus,  in  general  terms,  inefficient  redistribution  creates  distortions  by  reducing 
incentives for work or effort with a negative impact on aggregate productivity, or by 
discouraging  investment  and  hampering  factor  accumulation;  in  either  case,  the 
economic links yields a negative effect on growth. And in the view of the societies’ 
established reliance on redistribution programs, the fundamental question remains how 
to maximize their efficiency. 
 
2.2 Efficient redistribution: investment channel 
Contrarily  to  inefficient  redistribution,  efficient  income  redistribution  may  yield 
constructive effects when its instruments are not distortionary, thus creating positive 
externalities  and  enhancing  economic  growth  (Perotti,  1992,  1996;  Dixit  and 
Londregan,  1995;  Saint  Paul  and  Verdier,  1996;  Drazen,  2000;  Acemoglu  and 
Robinson, 2001, Acemoglu, 2009).
9 Some research suggests that the effect of policy on 
economic growth is induced primarily through the productivity channel (Rodrik, 1999). 
However, based on the further presented arguments from related research, we argue that 
the predominance of the productivity channel for policy effects on growth is more likely 
to  be  corroborated  when  negative  effects  of  redistribution  policy  on  growth  are 
                                                           
6  Developed  by  Black  (1948),  this  theorem  relates  the  nature  of  the  redistribution  program  to  the 
characteristics of the electorate and predicts that, provided single-peaked preferences, the equilibrium 
policy, conditioned by the median voter’s income relative to the mean, would be the one preferred by the 
median voter.  
7 The median voter takes into account its anticipated effect on the identity of the future median voter and 
thus on the equilibrium policy in the subsequent periods.  
8 A more recent development is the Probabilistic Voting Theory (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), which, 
contrary  to  MVT,  can  explain  voting  choices  even  when  voters’  preferences  are  not  single-peaked. 
Particularly relevant for political economy research topics is that it can explain, based on the degree of 
homogeneity or dispersion of voters’ preferences, why certain social groups are more politically powerful 
than others.  
9  As  in  fact  the  commonly  used  term  itself,  i.e.  efficient  redistribution,  is  suggestive  as  regards  the 




10 In what concerns positive effects, we sustain that investment is the key 
channel for increasing productivity and spurring economic growth. In fact, studies on 
the subject consentingly suggest that a positive effect on growth may be induced when 
redistribution  is  directed  at  increasing  investment  in  human  capital,  increasing 
investment  by  the  poor  while  preserving  investment  by  the  rich,  and  generally 
stimulating investment by securing sustainable industrial markets and reducing crime 
and social instability (Perotti, 1992, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Saint Paul and 
Verdier, 1996; Acemoglu, 2009).  
Taking as a working hypothesis one of the key arguments of endogenous growth 
theory,  namely,  human  capital  accumulation  as  the  engine  for  long-term  economic 
growth (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990, Drazen, 2000; Acemoglu, 2009), we construct our 
analysis of the relationship between redistribution, institutions and economic growth on 
the  basis  of  efficient  redistribution  policy  specifically  associated  with  stimulating 
investment in human capital accumulation.
11 In fact, because human capital is seen as 
an especially important  engine of  growth in both the theory and empirics of  recent 
growth models (Drazen, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu 2009), there 
can  be  a  significant  positive  growth  effect  and  an  aggregate  welfare  gain  from 
redistribution  focusing  on  human  capital  accumulation.
  An  integration  of  political 
economy and endogenous growth thus suggests a positive rather than a negative role for 
redistribution (Drazen, 2000). In particular, we follow the idea that redistribution aimed 
at increasing investment in human capital does not hamper factor accumulation, but, on 
the contrary, encourages it and thus stimulates growth (Perotti, 1992, 1996; Saint Paul 
and Verdier, 1996; Drazen, 2000; Acemoglu, 2009). In this respect, our discussion on 
efficient redistribution outlines a view on the normative political economy issue of how, 
given the existing political constraints, societies can be guided to best achieve specific 
economic  objectives.  Also,  we  believe  that  public  education  as  an  instrument  for 
motivating  human  capital  accumulation  is  most  justifiable  in  our  context,  since  we 
                                                           
10 Nonetheless, as we have seen in the previous subsection, apart from negatively affecting aggregate 
productivity  through ill-motivated production and occupational choices, inefficient redistribution  may 
also compromise investment decisions and thus induce just as important negative effects on economic 
growth through the investment channel. 
11 The idea that the accumulation of human capital, if not distorted, reduces inequality, facilitates efficient 
economic  performance  and  stimulates  economic  growth  is  a  widely  accepted  and  scientifically 
documented  view  (Perotti,  1996;  Saint  Paul  and  Verdier,  1996,  Drazen,  2000;  Acemoglu,  2009); 
therefore, we do not debate the usefulness of human capital accumulation.  
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consider human capital accumulation to be (at least in part) stimulated by public funds, 
i.e. redistribution collected resources.   
By subsidizing research, which is intrinsically associated with human capital, the 
government can increase the growth rate of the economy (e.g. Romer, 1990; Aghion and 
Howitt,  1992).  Similarly,  redistribution  is  beneficial  for  growth  when  implemented 
aiming at investing in human capital accumulation via public education, increasing the 
economy’s human capital stock  and having a  growth-promoting effect  by balancing 
income levels across dynasties, i.e. decreasing inequality (Saint Paul and Verdier, 1996; 
Acemoglu,  2009).  Also,  in  support  of  our  view  that  redistribution  associated  with 
investment in human capital accumulation enhances growth, we may refer studies that 
link economic growth to policy change and technological advance (where human capital 
is,  in  effect,  the  main  ingredient),  or  studies  providing  empirical  evidence  on  the 
historical  relationship  between  economic  growth,  the  institutional  factor,  and 
educational  reforms  (Acemoglu  and  Robinson,  2006;  Aghion  et  al.,  2007;  Nelson, 
2008).  
Moreover, defining the link between efficient redistribution and economic growth as 
a specific structural relationship turns clearer the inherent causality processes (Perotti, 
1996). In particular, efficient redistribution aimed at increasing investments in human 
capital accumulation may have a positive impact on aggregate economic performance in 
the result of an induced increasing equality effect (Perotti, 1996; Saint Paul and Verdier, 
1996;  Acemoglu,  2009).  This  allows  us  to  draw  further  inference  on  the  fact  that 
efficient  redistribution  associated  with  human  capital  accumulation  entails  positive 
effects on inequality, which further strengthens its positive economic impact.
12 
Finally, some of the above referred studies implicitly sustain the idea that, for a 
positive effect on growth, efficient forms of redistribution should be conditioned on 
economic  actions  and  not  on  political  characteristics.  Independently  of  the  political 
characteristics of the tax payers, different economic structures induce different effects of 
redistribution  on  growth  and,  in  structures  where  there  is  government  financing  of 
public  education,  the  effect  is  positive  (Perotti,  1992;  Dixit  and  Londregan,  1995; 
Acemoglu  and  Robinson,  2001).  Thus,  efficient  redistribution  aimed  at  increasing 
                                                           
12 Although we do not pursue this idea here, it may be useful for future, more detailed, directed research 
on the subject.  
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human  capital  accumulation  may,  in  fact,  help  correcting  some  of  the  failures  of 
inefficient redistribution, previously discussed.  
In  sum,  when  redistribution  targets  the  raise  of  the  possibilities  of  investing  in 
education, increasing human capital and thus promoting growth, redistributive transfers 
seem to affect growth positively rather than negatively. An essential condition for that 
result is for political considerations not to outweigh economic concerns, in which case 
income redistribution will be efficient in the sense that no production or occupational 
decisions will be distorted if political power is  not contested.  In the context of our 
research,  this  conclusion  offers  additional  motivation  to  our  interest  in  the  role  of 
political  rivalry  and  the  quality  of  political  institutions.  In  the  next  section  we  will 
develop a critical analysis concerning the idiosyncratic relations between institutions, in 
the political sense, and redistribution. This will conduct us to our ultimate research goal 




3.  Political Institutions and Redistribution 
From our earlier discussion on the relationship between redistribution and economic 
growth, based on numerous research findings, we conclude that efficient redistribution 
does  not  depress  aggregate  productivity,  increases  investment  in  human  capital 
accumulation and stimulates growth. In this section, our case is to present evidence that 
the  specific  relationship  between  income  redistribution  and  economic  growth  is 
endogenously determined by the political processes involved. As we will see, efficient 
political decisions that secure positive redistribution effects on growth, while avoiding 
policy failure, prove to be a difficult task in reality.  
 
3.1 Redistribution and political rivalry 
We  present  our  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  efficient  redistribution  and 
institutions from the perspective of intrinsic political incentives and social conflict of 
interests. We should note that, although we do not focus on specific political regimes, 
the inherent features of our research imply that the assumption of a pro-democratic 
regime (in which each voter with individual preferences can contribute to the formation  
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of aggregate public policy) seems more appropriate.
13 We believe that the democratic 
characteristic of struggling to maintain or expand group size in order to guarantee future 
political  power  is  fully  appropriate  for  defining  the  role  of  political  institutions  in 
establishing economic policy in general, and the efficiency of redistribution policies in 
particular (Dixit and  Londregan, 1995; Dixit et al., 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2001).
14 We also note that among the vast conceptual variety regarding the widely used 
term “institutions”,
15 our main research goal dictates the particular focus on “property-
rights institutions”, which we do not treat in the innovation approach manner, but rather 
in the political sense. More specifically, following Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) we 
assume  them  to  determine  the  vertical  links  between  various  social  groups,  i.e. 
determine the interactions between groups with different degrees of political power. 
This particular interpretation has a key importance for our subsequent analysis, and we 
will later relate it to Rodrik’s (2007) discussion on institutions for high-quality growth. 
Otherwise, in our discussion on political institutions and redistribution we will generally 
abstract from terminological and ideological issues.  
Our focus, thus, is on the view that political institutions are expected to implement 
efficient redistribution policies that directly contribute to promoting economic growth, 
and on the analysis of  how specific political processes inherent to any regime may 
distort  the  efficiency  of  these  interactions.  This  ideology-neutral  approach  is 
additionally motivated by numerous studies suggesting that there are positive efficient 
mechanisms  inherent  to  any  regimes  or  institutional  forms  that  should  be  cleverly 
employed (Przeworski and Robinson, 1993; Scruggs, 2001; Rodrik, 2007; Acemoglu, 
2009). Indeed, in the view of the broad class of economic and political institutions, the 
difference between their various types is not always clear, and thus it is often their 
combination and not the exclusivity of one or the other that is important (Acemoglu, 
2009). Considering the argument that dictatorships are better at mobilizing savings and 
                                                           
13 Note for example that, following Londregan and Poole (1992), in the case of an authoritarian regime a 
crucial but sufficient condition for non-distortionary policy would be to have a benevolent ruler, i.e. a 
ruler concerned with the well-being of the whole society and not just the political elite. Also, the pro-
democratic assumption is strongly supported by the MVT largely applied for formalizing analysis of the 
relationship between political institutions and redistribution. In particular, it brings evidence regarding the 
key importance of political parties’ size and voting options, naturally suggesting democratic societies, in 
which distributional conflicts are likely to be resolved in a manner that reflects the majority’s preferences. 
14 Some of the studies adopting research frameworks of explicit political regimes for relating political 
institutions  and  economic  outcomes  include:  Przeworski  and  Robinson  (1993),  Alesina  and  Perotti 
(1994), and Aghion et al. (2007), among many others. 
15  For  examples  of  specific  institutional  definitions  see  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1994),  Acemoglu  and 
Johnson (2005), Rodrik (2007) and Nelson (2008).  
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democracies are better at allocating investment, only a combination of a decentralised 
market mechanisms and strong institutions allows achieving the economic benefits of 
social  stability,  investment,  and  competitiveness  (Przeworski  and  Robinson,  1993; 
Scruggs, 2001; Rodrik, 2007). By these accounts, economic policy seems to result from 
considerations  crucial  for  any  political  arrangements  and  the  discussion  may  be 
therefore mostly resumed to the problem of policy efficiency as implemented by the 
prevailing  political  institutions.  As  we  will  show  by  further  arguments  from  related 
research,  we  find  these  considerations  to  represent  a  combination  of  preference 
heterogeneity,  political  power  motivations  and  specific  mechanisms  of  solving  the 
conflicts of interests in the society.  
In  studying  how  political  institutions  may  be  detrimental  to  growth,  many 
researchers  present  arguments  invoking  property  rights,  pressures  for  immediate 
consumption  reducing  investments  and  consequently  growth,  and  the  autonomy  of 
political institutions as a crucial factor determining the interest to maximize aggregate 
output (Przeworski and Robinson, 1993; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu and 
Robinson,  2006;  Nelson,  2008;  Acemoglu,  2009).  Other  researchers  invoke  reasons 
related to political instability generated by political competition resulting from ex-ante 
or ex-post heterogeneity in voters’ preferences, the strong impact of which creates a 
persisting tendency for strategic voting and proves to affect economic outcomes. While 
political  institutions  may  lead  to  better  economic  performance  when  the  more 
productive group holds the power in the society, political instability induced by strong 
political competition, on the contrary, is incompatible with an efficient execution of the 
government’s functions as regards economic performance (Persson and Tabellini, 1992: 
Alesina and Rodrik, 1992; Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Drazen, 2000; Scruggs, 2001; 
Acemoglu, 2009). Thus, most related studies imply that political power and political 
competition play a central role in the matter. As both empirical and historical findings 
suggest,  shifts  between  de  jure  and  de  facto  political  power  seem  to  occur  by  the 
decision of the elite, and the net effect of redistributive policies appears to depend on 
the perception by the ruling power of the costs of distortionary taxation weighed against 
the benefits of reduced social tensions (Przeworski and Robinson, 1993; Alesina and 
Perotti,  1994;  Acemoglu  and  Robinson;  2006).  In  fact,  because  equilibrium 
redistribution  policy  depends  on  conflicting  interests  (aggregated  through  political 
incentives and political institutions into public policy) over the distribution of income, 
in the context of political competition higher taxes will be more appealing, consequently  
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having a direct depressing impact on economic growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1992; 
Acemoglu, 2009). Thus, being intimately linked with conflicts of interest in the society, 
political competition will necessarily distort the outcomes of economic policies pursued 
by  the  institutions  in  power,  being  impossible  to  isolate  the  resulting  resources 
distribution from the aggregate economic performance. And given that, as the above 
referred studies indicate, any political regime is primarily concerned with protecting the 
interests of the groups that have political power, the resulting allocations are inefficient 
and often involve different types of distortions when political and economic powers are 
decoupled.
16  The  severity  of  these  distortions  (compared  to  those  generated  by 
alternative political powers) or whether a particular set of political institutions may lead 
to non-distortionary, i.e. efficient, redistribution policies, depends on the details of how 
it functions, on the technology and factor endowments of the society, and on which 
groups  benefit  from  these  institutions  (Dixit  and  Londregan,  1995;  Acemoglu  and 
Robinson, 2001; Aghion et al., 2007; Nelson, 2008; Acemoglu, 2009).  
Given  the  broad  range  of  possible  factors  that  fall  under  this  category  of 
institutional details, we consider it reasonable to aggregately reflect them in the quality 
of institutions, and consequently the quality of implemented policies that determine the 
nature of economic outcomes resulting from the link between political institutions and 
redistribution. And in the view of the above discussion, we conclude that the quality of 
political institutions explaining economic policy success or failure depends, in its turn, 
on how prevailing institutions manage political competition, which disturbs the balance 
between political and economic power. Therefore, we identify political competition, or 
political rivalry between the elite and other political groups as a key factor distorting 
the efficiency of economic allocations and actions, and leading to distortionary policy in 
general  and  distortionary  redistribution  policy  in  particular.  In  this  respect  our 
reasoning, as regards political rivalry, outlines a view on the positive political economy 
concern  of  how  political  constraints  may  explain  the  choice  of  policies,  and  thus 
economic  outcomes.  In  particular,  we  believe  there  is  a  strong  negative  impact  of 
political rivalry when goals pursued by the political elite, instead of economic efficiency 
                                                           
16 For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1992) conclude that individuals who have access to productive assets 
of an economy are more likely to be restrained in their desire to tax them, suggesting that it is easier to 
avoid damaging conflict over redistribution policies when the economy’s assets are widely shared.  
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considerations, determine the policy choice.
17 Based on our study of related research, 
we  assume  that  political  rivalry  may  arise  in  various  forms,  be  it  factor  price 
manipulation  or  political  competition  and  replacement  (following  the  definition  of 
Acemoglu, 2009), or political incentives in public policy and political instability.
18 We 
believe that political rivalry specifically reflected in the undue use of power by the 
political  elite  for  increasing  its  revenues  is  particularly  relevant  for  our  further 
discussion, especially in the view of the considered link to income redistribution. Such 
rivalry,  as  it  may  be  presumed,  will  distort the  outcomes  of  efficient  redistribution, 
rendering it inefficient, since in this case the elite will necessarily redistribute based on 
political and not economic characteristics. We will then consider that the effects of 
political  rivalry  may  be,  in  general,  associated  with  breaking  the  balance  between 
political power and economic opportunities, thus negatively affecting the relationship 
between political institutions, redistribution and economic outcomes, and in particular 
with generating episodes of expropriation. Expropriation, which we will discuss in more 
detail in the next section, is interpreted in our research context as the failure to employ 
the taxes levied through efficient redistribution for the originally intended objectives, 
instead using them for political rivalry related or generated purposes. 
In  sum,  to  the  extent  that  redistributive  policies  are  chosen  depending  on  both 
political  interests  and  incentives  that  policies  are  meant  to  induce,  it  appears  to  be 
directly influenced by political interactions between the elite and other social groups. 
We believe a crucial aspect of these interactions to be represented by political rivalry, 
which may considerably weaken the quality of political institutions, fundamental for 
securing  efficient  redistribution  policies.  In  Section  4  we  will  discuss  how  efficient 
redistribution, specifically associated with human capital accumulation and assumed to 
improve  economic  performance,  is  conditioned  by  the  ability  to  overcome  political 
constraints within the existing institutional framework. 
 
                                                           
17 Note that, in this case, it implies the possibility of consequences typical for inefficient redistribution, 
i.e. political versus economic characteristics, excessive taxation, etc. 
18 More specifically, Acemoglu (2009), distinguishes between political rivalry when enrichment by other 
groups may pose a threat to elite’s ability to use and benefit from their political power in the future (and 
distortionary taxes are then beneficial for the elite as a way of impoverishing their political competitors); 
and  factor  price  manipulation,  which  increases  the  elite’s  profits  indirectly  (when  the  elite  may  be 
engaged in production and recognize that taxes on other producers will reduce the demand for factors and 
lower their competitors’ production level).  
 
14
3.2 Political institutions and efficient redistribution: relation to public goods and 
government authority 
As  previously  stated,  in  this  work  we  focus  on  efficient  redistribution  policy 
specifically  aimed  at  stimulating  investments  in  human  capital  accumulation.  Given 
that, by our assumption, the latter is a crucial determinant of economic growth, it also 
plays  a  decisive  role  in  determining  aggregate  productivity.  The  same  assumption 
implies that we are considering complex investment measures, often proved to be most 
efficiently undertaken by the government, i.e. by political institutions in power (Drazen, 
2000; Acemoglu, 2009). Moreover, because our focus is on human capital investments 
in  the  form  of  publicly  provided  education,  aggregate  productivity  and  economic 
growth  through  human  capital  accumulation  depends  on  government  investments  in 
public goods. As follows, this implies a strong mobilization of public authorities in what 
concerns the allocations of taxes between groups to publically finance a private good. 
Moreover,  because  public  policy  emerges  when  political  institutions  succeed  in 
aggregating  conflicting  interests  of  different  social  groups  and  because  the  division 
between  political  and  economic  power  has  a  decisive  role  for  adopted  policies,  our 
analysis  on  efficient  redistribution  and  political  institutions,  involving  public  good 
features, demands accounting for political incentives of public goods provision, possible 
conflicts of interests, and as a result, the crucial role of political institutions.  
In particular, it may be inferred that the provision by the state of the appropriate 
amount of public goods depends on whether the politically powerful groups have the 
incentives to invest in their supply. As it may be presumed, this depends primarily on 
two conditions: political groups’ expected future benefits from such investments, and 
political interactions and conflicting interests in driving such investments.
19 As regards 
the  first  condition,  recalling  our  assumption  on  human  capital  accumulation  being 
fundamental for inducing a high rate of economic growth, future benefits from investing 
in the provision of related public goods would be secured and we should expect the 
government to have a strong incentive for providing them. However, as to the second 
condition, political rivalry is likely to distort political interactions and aggravate the 
conflicts of interests between rivalling groups, consequently distorting the effects of 
efficient  redistribution  policy  and  weakening  the  government’s  expected  role  in 
                                                           
19 As, for example, in Fisman (2001), who considers investment to be distorted not by redistribution but 
directly by political relations and argues that, when political interests rather than economic fundamentals 
are the primary determinant of profitability, distorted investment decisions may be taken.  
 
15
implementing aggregate investment measures. Given these considerations and in what 
public goods provision is concerned, governments subjected to frequent destabilizing 
episodes  of  political  rivalry  may  become  particularly  detrimental  to  economic 
performance.  This  raises  the  issue  of  weak  versus  strong  states,  in  the  sense  that 
government authority affects to a great extent not only the decision to invest in public 
goods, but the efficiency of such investments as well. In particular, excessively weak 
governments may not be able to implement efficient redistribution policies, while the 
uncontrolled  power  of  excessively  strong  governments  may  result  in  expropriation, 
either of them being just as costly to economic performance (Persson and Tabellini, 
1992; Alesina and Rodrik, 1992; Alesina and Perotti, 1994; Dixit and Londregan, 1995; 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu, 2005; Acemoglu, 2009). On the one hand, if 
the state is weak the elite anticipate that they will be unable to reap the benefits of their 
investments in the future, and thus are unwilling to invest in public goods. On the other 
hand, if the state is too strong, control over taxes imposed on the population is absent, 
and  even  when  investing  in  human  capital  accumulation  increases  overall  benefits, 
efficient  redistribution  specifically  associated  with  such  investments  will  be  neither 
required by the elite, nor supported by other social groups, since individuals have little 
means to control how the elite will actually use the collected tax revenues. 
In sum, when aggregate economic effects are targeted by efficient redistribution 
policy strongly related to public goods provision, either conditioning investments on 
political interests or limiting the rents that accrue to the state (i.e. hindering efficient 
redistribution) may lead to the failure of the government to perform its functions in 
providing public goods, and may have significant negative consequences for aggregate 
economic performance. The next section provides a closing discussion on these issues.  
 
 
4.  Human  Capital  Accumulation  and  Control-Rights  Institutions:  a  Political-
Economic Equilibrium 
In  this  section,  we  conclude  our  analysis  on  the  relationship  between  efficient 
redistribution  aimed  at  investments  in  human  capital  accumulation  and  political 
institutions,  by  defining  a  political-economic  equilibrium  conditioned  on  public 
education  fully  provided  by  the  government  and  efficient  control-rights  institutions, 
which  we  will  determine  in  the  following  discussion.  Because  the  argument  in  this 
section  merges  the  key  points  of  our  comparative  critical  assessment  of  directed  
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research presented separately in previous sections, we open our concluding discussion 
with a bibliographic summary table (Table 1) and a diagram summarizing the key points 
of our research (Figure 1). In the following table, we sum up the reviewed research 
works from the perspective of our reading of the literature, structured as to reflect the 
line of reasoning that supports our research objective. 
 
Table 1: Related research categorization based on our research objective 
* Provided efficient redistribution policy, political stability and efficient growth-oriented policies 
implementation 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Also, in Figure 1, we systematize the key points of the above discussion on 
redistribution and economic growth and on political institutions and redistribution in an 










Perotti (1992)*, Alesina and Perotti (1994)*, Perotti 
(1996)*, Saint Paul and Verdier (1996)*, Drazen (2000)*, 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Aghion et al. (2007)*, 
Rodrik (2007)*, Acemoglu (2009) 
Negative impact 
Alesina and Rodrik (1992), Persson and Tabellini (1992), 
Przeworski and Robinson (1993), Dixit and Londregan 
(1995), Drazen (2000), Dixit et al. (2000), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2001), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), 
Nelson (2008), Acemoglu (2009) 





Perotti (1992), Perotti (1996), Saint Paul and Verdier 
(1996), Drazen (2000), Acemoglu (2009). 
Inefficient 
redistribution 
Persson and Tabellini (1992), Alesina and Rodrik (1992), 
Dixit and Londregan (1995), Drazen, (2000), Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu (2009). 
3. Political versus economic characteristics 
Dixit and Londregan (1995), Drazen (2000), Dixit et al. 
(2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006), Acemoglu (2009) 
4. Political rivalry 
Londregan and Poole (1992), Alesina and Perotti (1994), 
Dixit and Londregan (1995), Drazen (2000), Dixit et al. 
(2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006), Acemoglu (2009) 
5. Human capital accumulation and 
economic growth 
Lucas (1988), Perotti (1992), Perotti (1996), Saint Paul 
and Verdier (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1999), 
Drazen (2000), Blankenau and Simpson (2004), 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Aghion et al. (2007), 
Acemoglu (2009) 
6. Quality of institutions (efficient 
redistribution, human capital 
accumulation) 
Przeworski and Robinson (1993), Saint Paul and Verdier 
(1996), Rodrik (1999), Drazen (2000), Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006), Aghion et al. (2007)*, Rodrik (2007), 
Acemoglu (2009)  
 
17
Figure 1: Quality of institutional factor and redistribution policies: systematization 
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Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The  above  discussion  on  efficient  redistribution,  aggregate  growth  determinants 
and economic role of public goods provided by the government leads us to specifically 
select full provision of public education to support our conclusions. We particularly 
overrule  partial  subsidization  of  public  education  because  it  involves  the  need  to 
contribute  with  individual  resources,  which  would  most  probably  prevent  the  less 
economically favoured social groups from entering the program, as the total economic 
costs  for  them  may  exceed  economic  benefits.
20  As  this  may  partially  compromise 
human capital accumulation, an adverse effect on economic growth would be implied 
and efficient redistribution would become distortionary and similar to the inefficient 
                                                           
20 Supported by studies suggesting a negative effect of public education expenditure on redistribution and 
economic growth in a framework in which private and public investments are inputs to human capital 
accumulation,  i.e.  partial  subsidization  of  education  (Fernandez  and  Rogerson,  1999;  Blankenau  and 
Simpson, 2004).  
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one.  Because  this  contradicts  our  initial  assumption  of  a  “positive”  efficient 
redistribution effect, namely, increasing investment in human capital accumulation and 
promoting  growth, we focus on public education with unconstrained access.
21 More 
specifically, provided unlimited access, public education is by its nature a public good 
with  all  education  costs  fully  covered  by  the  government  and  requiring  no  private 
resource input. Since use of such public education is not impeded by class distinctions, 
i.e. rich or poor, or political characteristics, i.e. elite or opposition, we consider that it 
creates real possibilities for avoiding redistribution inefficiencies by preventing (at least 
in  certain  areas)  possible  conflicts  of  interests.  We  sustain  that,  in  the  presence  of 
efficient redistribution and human capital accumulation externalities, the growth rate of 
the economy may actually increase in the tax rate employed for financing human capital 
accumulation (see Drazen, 2001). Considering this positive expected outcome, efficient 
redistribution  policy  specifically  associated  with  investment  in  human  capital 
accumulation and the provision of related public goods appears to be a desired feature 
of growth-enhancing institutions. Having reached this stage in our reasoning, let us now 
outline a conclusion based on the above-presented discussion, as to what can disturb 
this outwardly straightforward interpretation. 
As we have seen, in a political economy context the politically powerful group has 
no incentives to invest  in the public  goods when future rents from these  goods are 
expected to be low or  no returns  are expected at all. Although this is not likely to 
happen for the particular reason of human capital accumulation assumed to induce a 
higher rate of economic growth, which also increases returns on investments, it may 
nevertheless  be  a  consequence  of  some  negative  features  of  the  political  processes 
involved.  In  particular,  as  we  have  previously  established,  in  what  public  goods 
provision  is  concerned,  governments  subjected  to  frequent  destabilizing  episodes  of 
political rivalry may become considerably costly to economic performance. This may 
happen in the case of either a too weak or a too strong state. The former entails that 
none of the conflicting political groups is sufficiently strong to gain political control 
through  majority  support,  and  the  latter  implies  that  one  excessively  strong  party 
struggles  to  keep  its  political  (and  economic)  control  through  misguiding  practices. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that only states with intermediate levels of strength may 
                                                           
21 Provided unlimited access, public education is by its nature a public good with all education costs fully 
covered by the government and requiring no private resource input.  
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be most capable and most interested to reap the benefits of efficient redistribution by 
investing in human capital accumulation. We will come back to this conclusion shortly. 
Furthermore,  to  the  extent  that  we  have  considered  political  rivalry  to  distort 
efficient redistribution so as it may be associated with expropriation, the case of an 
excessively  strong  government  is  of  particular  interest  for  our  discussion.  In  the 
relationship between social groups with different degrees of political power, the issue of 
property  rights  protection  is  directly  relevant.  When  the  political  elite  is  virtually 
unaffected by the authority of property-rights institutions, the available property rights 
crucial for stimulating and securing investments may not be sufficient per se. Because 
in  our  political  economy  context  there  are  no  clearly  set  boundaries  between  the 
political elite and property-rights institutions, it is possible that in some cases they are of 
the  same  nature,  and  efficient  separation  between  ex-ante  arrangements  and  ex-post 
distortions (so as to regulate the relationship between state and individuals in order to 
avoid policy failures and expropriation threats) will be difficult. Since, as discussed in 
the previous section, we build a relation between political rivalry, expropriation and the 
distortionary  use  of  efficient  redistribution  policy,  a  negative  institutional  impact  is 
produced through the political rivalry mechanism when property-rights institutions are 
inefficient on accounts of an excessively strong government. Thus, when the political 
constraints that the society may impose on the ruling power are relatively inefficient, 
individual economic and investment decisions are directly affected, and to the extent 
that the factor affected by distortionary redistribution policy is a major input into the 
growth process, as is the case for human capital, the effect on growth is clearly adverse. 
We shall come back to discussing the role that political rivalry and political constraints 
imposed by the society may have in determining the existence of a political-economic 
equilibrium. 
Within this line of reasoning we believe that control-rights institutions, rather than 
property-rights institutions, should play a key role in our research setting. In particular, 
following  Rodrik  (2007),  we  argue  that  efficient  property-rights  institutions  should 
secure adequate  control rights rather than just ownership rights, because even when 
individuals have a certain degree of ownership of property rights they do not always 
have  sufficient  control  over  these  rights.  In  our  view,  apart  from  preserving  the 
distinctive  feature  of  property-rights  institutions,  which  is  determining  the  vertical  
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relationships between social groups with different degrees of political power, control-
rights institutions may actually constrain the elite in their expropriation intents.
22 Thus, 
the connotation we attribute to control-rights institutions is a combination of specific 
policy mechanisms (which society has at hand to ensure efficiency and non-distortion) 
with a hierarchical representation of power. In this sense, in our context an efficient 
redistribution policy by which taxes are particularly used for stimulating human capital 
accumulation  through  public  education  would  enable  the  tax-payers  to  eventually 
control how a part of their income given for tax payments is used, since they are in 
effect  the  direct  beneficiaries  of  the  public  education  system  provided  by  the 
government. Therefore, in the decision to accumulate production factors in general and 
human capital in particular, we attribute a crucial role to control-rights institutions.  
From the above discussion and returning to the government authority issue, it can 
be concluded that a medium strong state could be most conducive to growth-enhancing 
efficient redistribution policies. In particular, we argue that it implies well-functioning 
control-rights institutions, a relatively balanced power distribution between the elite and 
other groups, and efficient taxation mechanisms with corresponding levels of public 
goods provision. It also implies that redistribution policy aimed at investments in human 
capital accumulation is an efficient and a publicly accepted policy, in the sense that its 
implementation  involves  none  or  minimum  political  and  social  distortions.  In  our 
context,  absence  of  political  distortions  means  that  taxation  will  be  fundamentally 
different  from  expropriation,  since  tax-revenues  will  be  directed  for  public  goods 
provision, from which aggregate benefits may be generated.
23 On its turn, the degree of 
social  distortions  is  what  determines  public  acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  particular 
redistribution  policy,  and  in  our  case  the  absence  of  the  former  implies  the  public 
acceptance of the latter. This arrangement has in fact, strong economic reasons. The 
mechanism we emphasize in this work is that when taxation revenues are particularly 
employed for financing human capital accumulation, e.g. through tax-financed public 
education, increased investment by the direct beneficiaries of redistribution can have a 
positive effect on those being taxed.
24 Given that the efficiency of political institutions 
                                                           
22 Recall that in our research context we interpret expropriation as the failure to employ the taxes levied 
by efficient redistribution for investments in human capital accumulation as originally intended, instead 
being used for political rivalry related purposes. 
23 As opposed to expropriation, when a share of individuals’ income is taken by the government for its 
own consumption. 
24 For examples see Perotti (1996), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996), Drazen (2000) and Acemoglu (2009).  
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has a strong impact on policies that may enhance growth in the presence of positive 
redistribution  externalities  (such  as  investing  tax-revenues  into  human  capital 
accumulation in the form of public education in the presence of an expected positive 
impact on growth), human capital accumulation itself becomes strongly related to the 
quality  of  the  institutional  factor.  This  conclusion  is  also  supported  by  important 
empirical evidence presented in Acemoglu (2009), inferring that only countries with 
relatively  good  institutions  have  encouraged  the  majority  of  the  population  to 
accumulate human capital. Therefore, as regards the efficiency of political institutions, 
we sustain that relatively large investments in human capital accumulation may be a fair 
sign of higher-quality institutions.  
Considering  thus  the  relationship  between  political  institutions,  income 
redistribution and economic growth from the perspective of human capital accumulation 
(endogenous growth theory) and institutional quality (new political economy), a specific 
mechanism linking the above-mentioned key components can be outlined. We sustain 
that  there  is  a  continuous  twofold  interaction  linking  political  institutions  and 
redistribution policy to economic growth, which we define as the “cause-consequence” 
processes. Separately, each one has its own specific characteristics and their particular 
combinations induce distinct consequences for each level of interaction specifically and 
for economic growth generally. It should be noted that the entire process, as well as the 
final impact on economic growth, is endogenously and gradually determined by each 
level’s interactive outcomes. Namely, from the political institutions side the “cause-
consequence” sequence we build goes through: political institutions – political rivalry – 
quality of institutions – economic growth. And from the redistribution policy side the 
sequence  is:  redistribution  policy  –  type  of  redistribution  –  aim  served  –  economic 












Figure 2: Interaction mechanisms between institutions, redistribution policy and 
economic growth 
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Medium strong state
Good control-rights institutions
Redistribution policy aimed at investment in human capital accumulation
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Inequality issues
Public goods supporting 
aggregate productivity
* In the particular context of our research. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
As  regards  our  “cause-consequence”  specification,  we  sustain  that  the  political 
institutions block is the initiating factor in the sequence, while the redistribution policy 
block is the reacting one. Initially, political institutions are responsible for developing 
redistribution  policies.  Then,  political  rivalry  distortions  influence  the  choice  of  the 
various types of redistribution policies with a direct influence on institutional quality 
and the aim of a chosen redistribution policy type. Here, relevant for the next level of 
interaction are the predominant characteristics, i.e., political versus economic, jointly 
determining the efficiency or inefficiency of the implemented redistribution policy and 
the cumulative, positive or negative, impact on economic growth. We particularly focus 
on the positive effect, which we consider to result from a combination of medium strong 
state and good control-rights institutions, generating a balance between political rivalry  
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and  people’s  power,  partly  secured  by  redistributive  policy  aimed  at  investment  in 
human capital accumulation. 
Thus,  in  the  framework  of  the  relationship  between  efficient  redistribution  and 
political institutions that we specifically analyse through the link between human capital 
accumulation and political rivalry, we arrive at the definition of a political-economic 
equilibrium.  We  particularly  define  it  as  a  combination  of  a  medium  strong  state, 
reliable control-rights institutions and efficient redistribution aimed at human capital 
accumulation such that, on the one hand, individuals have sufficient control-rights to 
ensure them from expropriation, and, on the other hand, the state is guaranteed to follow 
on  its  redistribution  policy  engagements.  In  such  a  political-economic  equilibrium, 
efficient  growth-enhancing  institutions  imply  not  only  that  appropriate  public  good 
investments will be undertaken to support aggregate productivity, increase human factor 
accumulation  and  stimulate  growth,  but  when  combined  with  the  above-emphasized 
importance of control-rights institutions also provide sufficient security of control rights 
for  individuals,  thus  avoiding  expropriation  in  the  form  of  ex-post  redistributive 
distortions. We also emphasize that the existence of this political-economic equilibrium 
is primarily determined by the key factors of political rivalry and political constraints 
imposed by the society from the perspective of redistribution policy and human capital 
accumulation, as discussed above. 
In  particular,  political  rivalry  may  generate  imperfections  in  the  functioning  of 
control-rights institutions and introduce expropriation threats, affecting thus the security 
of investment in human capital accumulation, the efficiency of redistribution policies, 
and  consequently  affecting  growth.  In  a  dynamic  framework,  this  may  occur  when 
pressures  from  political  rivalry  introduce  previously  absent  limitations  (in  some 
dimension) of the voting rights over redistribution policies. This may result in limited 
franchise  and  generate  disproportionate  weights  in  the  decision  process,  which  will 
necessarily bias the final policy choice and result in inefficient redistribution (Drazen, 
2000).
25  In  these  circumstances,  the  well-functioning  of  control-rights  institutions 
becomes  especially  important,  and  the  relative  degree  of  constraints  on  political 
monopoly  power  determines  the  adoption  of  efficient  redistribution  policy,  thus 
allowing for a (new) political-economic equilibrium. Relating the efficiency of control-
                                                           
25 These limits on  voting rights  may be imposed based on income or other observable criteria, may 
depend on the degree of inequality or on factor disproportionate ownership, especially relevant for capital 
intensive sectors.  
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rights institutions (from the perspective of political rivalry and expropriation) to the 
degree  of  constraints  on  political  monopoly  power,  we  can  interpret  the  implicit 
economic costs in terms of forgone investments in human capital accumulation and 
economic  growth  opportunities.  In  particular,  because  political  rivalry  generates 
distortions that negatively affect the quality of institutions, the resulting less efficient 
control-rights  institutions  will  imply  that  imposing  political  constraints  will  present 
higher  social  costs,  lowering  investments  and  reducing  economic  growth.  This 
reasoning strongly emphasizes the importance of the quality of political institutions, in 
the sense that qualitative changes in control-rights institutions will induce level changes 
in  the  social  costs  of  political  constraints,  so  that  depending  on  the  particular 
combination of efficient control-rights institutions, the political power of the elite, and 
the role attributed to efficient redistribution aimed at stimulating investment in human 
capital  accumulation,  the  above  defined  political-economic  equilibrium  may  exist. 
When political rivalry distorts the elite’s commitment to the efficient, growth-enhancing 
redistribution policy, consequently distorting the balance between the key equilibrium 
components,  qualitative  changes  in  control-rights  institutions  could  either  help  the 
convergence  or  induce  the  divergence  from  the  political-economic  equilibrium.  We 
leave  the  question  of  whether  different  equilibrium  solutions  are  possible  in  such  a 
political economy setting for further, more formalized, research. 
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
In this paper, based on a comparative critical assessment of an extensive literature 
covering both political economy and economic growth fields, we have studied how the 
quality of the institutional factor may influence the efficiency of redistribution policy 
specifically associated with human capital accumulation. We have seen that efficient 
redistribution  creates  positive  externalities  by  enabling  investment  in  human  capital 
accumulation, and is therefore essentially different from inefficient redistribution, which 
creates negative externalities by lowering factor endowments and decreasing aggregate 
productivity. Positive redistribution policy effects may be secured when tax-revenues 
are appropriately allocated to stimulate investment in human capital accumulation in the 
form of public tax-financed education, increasing productivity and improving aggregate 
economic performance.   
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In the decision to accumulate production factors in general and human capital in 
particular, we have attributed a crucial role to control-rights institutions, which we have 
defined  as  a  combination  of  specific  policy  mechanisms  and  a  hierarchical 
representation of power. We have also argued that the quality of these institutions is the 
decisive  factor  in  the  final  outcome,  in  the  sense  that  efficient  growth-enhancing 
institutions  should  not  only  imply  that  appropriate  public  good  investments  will  be 
undertaken to support aggregate productivity, increase human factor accumulation and 
stimulate growth, but also provide sufficient security of control rights for individuals, 
thus avoiding expropriation in the form of ex-post redistributive distortions. We have 
then defined a political-economic equilibrium as a combination of a medium strong 
state,  reliable  control-rights  institutions  and  efficient  redistribution  aimed  at  human 
capital accumulation. We also emphasized that its existence is primarily conditioned by 
political rivalry generating distortions that negatively affect the quality of institutions. 
We concluded that when political rivalry distorts the elite’s commitment to the efficient, 
growth-enhancing redistribution policy, consequently distorting the balance between the 
key  equilibrium  components,  qualitative  changes  in  control-rights  institutions  could 
either  help  the  convergence  or  induce  the  divergence  from  the  defined  political-
economic equilibrium. We leave the question of whether different equilibrium solutions 
are possible in such a political economy setting for further, more formalized, research.  
We also identify several other possible topics for future work. For  example, in 
alternative  to  the  largely  employed  Median  Voter  Theorem,  the  more  recent 
Probabilistic Voting Theorem could be applied in order to deepen the understanding of 
mechanisms  linking  political  institutions,  inequality  and  redistribution  policies 
(including publicly provided education) with a direct effect on economic growth. We 
have also seen that the analysis on the mechanisms of efficient redistribution associated 
with human capital accumulation goes closely in hand with issues of inequality and its 
role on economic growth. Therefore, another possible venue of future research could be 
oriented  towards  emphasizing  the  specific  effects  of  inequality  in  a  redistribution 
aiming  at  increasing  investment  in  human  capital  accumulation,  which  reduces 
inequality and increases growth. And, as a final point, a challenging task would be to 
develop  an  analytical  model  incorporating  the  institutional  impact  mechanisms 
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